Undergoing Challenges, U.S. Coast Guard Aviation Revisits Tactics
Undergoing Challenges, U.S. Coast Guard Aviation Revisits Tactics
Issues with the Coast Guard's fleet of 135 rescue, smuggling, and migrant-detecting helicopters are driving the Coast Guard aviation division to reconsider their strategy for their 200 patrol aircraft and helicopters.
This shift, following years of coverage by Our Website.com about the Coast Guard's aviation portfolio problems, is a positive development. The tipping point, the sudden imposition of flight hour restrictions on the Coast Guard's MH-60T "Jayhawk" medium-range recovery helicopters reported by Our Website in August, has finally urged the Coast Guard to establish new strategic objectives and overhaul an operational plan that hasn't changed significantly since the failed Deepwater procurement era. If granted permission and they choose to, the Coast Guard can now potentially address America's evolving maritime strategic priorities from the air.
The Coast Guard needs to act swiftly. The rotary wing crisis within the Coast Guard is unlikely to disappear. As of early December, around 18% of the Coast Guard's 45-strong MH-60T "Jayhawk" medium-range recovery fleet is non-operational. Eight helicopters with over 19,000 flight hours have been permanently grounded.
This situation may be detrimental for the MH-60T's future as the principal rotary-wing asset of the Coast Guard. If the flight restrictions remain, the Coast Guard aviation, primarily led by the heavily used Jayhawks, might face serious challenges. By late 2023, over 90% of the Coast Guard's MH-60T helicopters will be exceeding 16,000 flight hours, meaning several more Jayhawks will soon reach the new 19,000 flight hour cap.
Flight hour restrictions have impacted the service significantly. In practical terms, a reduction of 1,000 hours cuts almost two years of service from each Jayhawk. The possibility that the large helicopters may never be able to operate beyond 20,000 hours, a goal the Coast Guard is forcing its smaller MH-65E Dolphin helicopters to meet, is causing unease in Coast Guard Headquarters, which has been firm in supporting the aviation recapitalization plan.
Coast Guard leadership is now showing signs of acknowledging the gravity of the situation. A new aviation strategy is in development. A Coast Guard spokesperson stated, “We are developing a comprehensive strategy for the future of Coast Guard Aviation,” which will outline fleet transitions across both rotary and fixed-wing aircraft, as well as the potential development of an unmanned aircraft system.
It's heartening to hear that the Coast Guard is considering revising several long-standing operational assumptions. Although a draft strategy has been circulating, the Coast Guard will not make the document available for review. Industry observers are skeptical that the Coast Guard, reacting hastily under the threat of an imminent crisis, will comprehensively address the Service's increased importance. However, optimism is growing. There is, at last, hope that the penny-pinching maritime border security service may begin demanding the necessary funds for this deserving Service to operate effectively.
The Crash and Burn of the Coast Guard Aviation Strategy:
Eight non-operational helicopters might not seem like a substantial number, but they are primarily responsible for the Coast Guard taking their aviation issues seriously. The operational restrictions on the MH-60T fleet are impeding the Coast Guard's multidecade-long goal of moving away from the small MH-65E Dolphin helicopter, and there's no way to disguise the problem or delay it by putting off action for two years until the next set of Coast Guard aviation admirals take charge.
Having a single-helicopter Coast Guard seems ideal. By flying a single platform—the larger MH-60T Jayhawk—the Coast Guard could significantly lower training and sustainment costs. The more capable helicopter could take on more challenging missions.
However, executing this strategy has been incredibly challenging. An abrupt transition to a single-helicopter fleet, using newly-built helicopters, would exhaust the Coast Guard's limited $13 billion budget. Instead, the budget-conscious Coast Guard developed a complex recapitalization plan that would stretch out transition costs and allow the gradual replacement and expansion of the existing fleet of MH-60T choppers.
On paper, this plan looks effective. To save money, the Coast Guard is maximizing flight hours on their 90 aging Airbus MH-65E Dolphin helicopters, buying time until they can upgrade and expand the MH-60T fleet. Every dollar saved has been counted diligently.
In actuality, the cost-cutting effort has been a discouraging failure. To work, the Coast Guard requires the Dolphins to fly a staggering 30,000 flight hours (a mark that even Navy helicopters retire after 12,000 hours). As the aging Dolphins are pushed towards record-breaking flight time limits, they will eventually be replaced by modernized Jayhawks—a cost-effective fleet mostly sourced from retired Navy surplus.
But these efforts have progressed slower than anticipated, eroding any operational flexibility the Coast Guard aviation had.
Due to a sudden reduction of operating hours by a thousand for the MH-60Ts, the Coast Guard is finding itself in a tight spot. Their austerity measures in budgeting have led them to overuse their rotorcraft fleet, potentially leading to unsafe conditions. The initial cost savings calculations no longer hold water.
From a taxpayer's perspective, the Coast Guard's frugality in financial management has been impressive. They've squeezed every last operational hour out of their helicopter fleet, but now, without a swift and substantial enhancement in capability, the Coast Guard is faced with a tough decision. They either risk flying unsafe aircraft or decline missions, preserving the limited flight hours remaining in the Coast Guard's helicopter fleet.
The Coast Guard's Aviation Needs a Real Plan Now
As the Coast Guard's rotorcraft fleet weakens, other issues are starting to surface.
In hindsight, the Coast Guard's aviation strategy was built on optimistic projections concerning Coast Guard base capabilities, expected base consolidations, and predicted operational costs. These savings didn't materialize as planned. The Coast Guard's leadership, entrenched in their theories, made the situation worse by being stubborn and unwilling to consider the operational requirements necessitated by shifting to a more complex and larger rotorcraft fleet.
The service amplified its long-term dangers by failing to engage sufficiently in the Pentagon's Future Vertical Lift Program, trying to persuade the Department of Defense to address the Coast Guard's unique rotorcraft needs. With the Pentagon turning away from conventional helicopters, the Coast Guard has been left without assistance from its more generously funded military counterparts.
The Coast Guard's scant recapitalization efforts moved ahead without a clear blueprint to manage the inevitable delays in programs. Coast Guard aviation leadership, with only a brief two-year term before departing the service, had limited ability to transition from managing short-term targets to tackling strategic challenges.
Years of focused on immediate availability over developing long-term solutions have taken a toll on Coast Guard aviation. In aviation, Coast Guard Admirals haven't done an excellent job of preparing their junior leaders for success. They're suffering the consequences. As the fleet transitioned into a variety of older and heavily-used aircraft, responsibility for accidents, failures, and disasters have regularly been placed on the Coast Guard's group of mid-career aviators and maintenance personnel.
Adding to this, the Coast Guard found itself in an operational rut. Its leaders seemed to believe that their MH-60T fleet could surpass 20,000 flight hours. The Coast Guard expected to push the components on their heavily-used choppers beyond the "service life" engineering analyses and beyond, utilizing the same operational template as the Service's well-used MH-65E Dolphins.
However, the Jayhawk helicopter is no Dolphin. With many Blackhawks serving other clients, the Coast Guard lacks influence over the original manufacturer. It cannot force Lockheed to accommodate the Coast Guard's unrealistic service life expectations. And, as a more substantial and intricate platform, the wear and tear—and the resulting maintenance burden and additional operational risks—have proven to be a heavy lift for the Coast Guard to handle.
Rather than deal with the constant swapping of broken components and getting aged craft into the air, disgruntled flight crews—who are neither growing nor receiving the necessary support to cope with their escalating maintenance workload—are opting to leave. Frustrated Coast Guard aviation personnel are passing up retention bonuses of between $35,000 to $50,000 annually.
The past few years have been difficult for Coast Guard aviators. For decades, the Coast Guard has done a commendable job of maximizing the taxpayer dollar. Now that the Coast Guard is rethinking its fleet mix and aviation operations, it is time for the service to be recognized for its challenges. But to receive its due, the Coast Guard needs to rally, rebuild, and then champion an aviation strategy that makes minimal sacrifices.
Lacking an infusion of cash for new helicopters, patrol aircraft, and unmanned technology, the Coast Guard's predicament is clear. Either Coast Guard aviators can continue to save lives in maritime emergencies and conduct elite maritime border security, threatening hostile Russian, Chinese fleets, and migrant armadas, or they can become a disheartened group of penny-pinchers, concentrating solely on maintenance and patching together a jumble of broken subsystems into a makeshift state of readiness.
The vibrant red Coast Guard helicopters and aircraft symbolize America's life-saving maritime law enforcement service. It is time for the Administration, Congress, and the rest of the DHS to recognize and financially support America's hardest-worked rotorcraft fleet and the rest of Coast Guard aviation.
- The flight hour restrictions placed on the Coast Guard's MH-60T "Jayhawk" medium-range recovery helicopters have encouraged a reevaluation of the USCG's aviation strategy, which includes a substantial number of these helicopters.
- In light of the grounding of several MH-60T "Jayhawk" helicopters due to excessive flight hours, the Coast Guard is now considering a comprehensive strategy for its aviation division, encompassing fleet transitions and the potential development of an unmanned aircraft system.
- With 8 out of 45 MH-60T "Jayhawk" helicopters currently non-operational, and flight hour limitations remaining in effect for the remaining fleet, the Coast Guard's national security operations and applications of the MH-65 Dolphin might be significantly impacted.
- In response to the operational limitations imposed on the MH-60T "Jayhawk" fleet, the US Coast Guard is developing a long-term strategy to address its constraints in aviation, including fleet transitions for both rotary and fixed-wing aircraft, as well as exploring the possibility of introducing an unmanned aircraft system.